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1. Introduction 
Since the study of subjective well-being gained wider interest in the early nineties in 
both academia and among the public, some countries have gradually begun discussing 
the maximization of citizens’ ‘happiness’ as a national goal. Even though the field now 
known as ‘happiness studies’ has come a long way since its beginnings in psychology, 
the advent of serious discussions in mainstream politics about including happiness goals 
in policy evaluations has  made the study of  potential happiness  policies even more 
urgent (e.g. Layard, 2006). 
One of the main questions in this literature is to what extent national institutions 
affect people’s happiness. Institutions, defined broadly by North (1990) as ‘the rules of 
the game’, regulate public and private affairs in all modern societies and could thus be 
expected to exert an important influence on individual well-being. Modern economics 
and  political  science  assigns  ‘institutions’,  both  formal  and  informal,  a  key  role  in 
society,  for  example  by  fuelling  economic  openness  and  growth  and  stabilizing 
liberalization and democracy.
1 Indeed, the significance of informal institutions such as 
social trust – unwritten rules, social norms and codes of conduct – is recognized by 
many studies as a key source of happiness, at least in rich countries (Diener, Diener and 
Diener, 1995; Uslaner, 2002; Bjørnskov, 2003; Helliwell, 2003, 2006). 
However, it seems a priori reasonable to conjecture that the quality of formal 
institutions  of  society  should  also  affect  the  life  satisfaction  of  its  citizens.  Well-
functioning legal systems provide and enforce property rights, insuring citizens against 
violence, theft and economic exploitation, while democratic institutions and political 
                                                
1  See  Zak  and  Knack  (2001),  de  Haan  et  al.,  (2006),  Gassebner,  Keck  and  Teh  (2006),  Aidt  and 
Gassebner (2007), Engerman and Sokoloff (2008), Bjørnskov (2008), and Méon and Sekkat (2008).   3 
decentralization  provide  everyone  with  the  means  to  influence  the  political  process 
(Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 2008a, 2008b; Dorn et al., 2007, 2008, Fischer, 2008a). 
However minute such influences may seem on policy outcomes, good institutions also 
create ‘procedural utility’, with the potential consequence that people may tolerate even 
substantial violations of their rights as long as public institutions treat them in a fair 
manner  after  such  incidents  (Stutzer  and  Frey,  2003;  Frey  and  Stutzer,  2005).
2  In 
addition, formal institutions could affect happiness indirectly by giving rise to other 
factors associated with happiness. 
Yet, whether the quality of formal institutions is actually associated with national 
happiness remains an empirical question without a clear answer, as previous studies find 
opposing results (cf. Helliwell, 2006; Ovaska and Takashima, 2006; Bjørnskov, Dreher 
and Fischer, 2008a; Dorn et al., 2007). Many factors could contribute to the empirical 
confusion. First, neither happiness nor institutional quality is easily measured, and most 
existing indicators are arguably imprecise. Second, there is the potential of committing 
an  ecological  fallacy  by  drawing  cross-level  inferences  (Manski,  2000;  Manski  and 
Cho, 2008). From using purely aggregate cross-country indicators false implications 
might be drawn for single individuals living in those countries (Robinson, 1950). On the 
other hand, environmental factors can often play important roles that are not captured in 
purely individual-level studies (Pearce, 2000). And third, there seem to be no good 
theoretical or intuitive reasons to assume that the same model applies to poor and rich 
countries, which most of the literature implicitly does. 
                                                
2 Moreover, informal institutions such as social trust – the belief that most people can be trusted to follow 
common societal norms – as well as other types of social capital can arguably also contribute to creating a 
safe and fulfilling social environment (cf. Uslaner, 2002; Helliwell, 2006).   4 
This paper addresses the question of the potential influence of formal institutions. 
Using a set of potential macro-level determinants of national happiness derived from 
previous studies, we test the association between these, a set of different indicators of 
institutional  quality,  and  national  happiness.  We  test  the  robustness  of  our  results 
employing various alternative measures of life satisfaction, based on two recent studies 
(Helliwell,  2006;  Bjørnskov,  Dreher  and  Fischer,  2008a).  The  results  show  some 
support for the importance of institutional quality on happiness. They are, however, not 
completely robust to how aggregate life satisfaction is defined. More detailed analysis 
points to a differential role of economic as compared to political institutions in the 
course  of  overall  societal  development.  These  differences  might  partly  explain  the 
contradictory results of previous studies neglecting these interactions. 
 
2. Happiness and institutional quality 
The  study  of  happiness  and  life  satisfaction  has  explored  a  very  large  range  of 
potentially determining factors at both the micro, meso and macro level. Quite often, the 
findings have been contradictory and even when not, the results of the literature can be 
puzzling  in  the  light  of  existing  theory  in  economics  and  political  science,  and  of 
common  sense.  The  potential  influence  of  formal  institutions  on  average  levels  of 
happiness in different countries has been explored in a number of previous studies, and 
of the myriad of formal institutions that could in principle affect people’s well-being, 
the following have been particularly in the focus of previous research: the presence of 
democratic institutions and civil liberties, the quality of legal institutions and the rule of 
law,  government  effectiveness  and  economic  freedom,  alongside  with  political   5 
constraints at the federal level such as bicameralism, subsidiarity in political decision-
making and spending decentralization. 
According to Frey and Stutzer (2000a, 934), “extended individual participation 
possibilities in the form of initiatives and referenda” in Swiss cantons contribute to 
individual happiness in Switzerland. These results, however, seem not to be robust to 
changes in the specification of the model. Specifically, the existence of institutions of 
direct  democracy  in  Swiss  cantons  has  been  shown  to  proxy  for  the  differences  in 
happiness between the country’s ethnic groups (Dorn et al., 2008). As Dorn et al. (2007, 
517)  show  for  a  sample  of  mostly  OECD  countries,  more  political  rights  “lead  to 
procedures and policies that correspond more closely to voters’ preferences and thus 
increase people’s happiness.”  In contrast, the  recent multi-level study  in Bjørnskov, 
Dreher  and  Fischer  (2008a)  finds  no  robust  association  between  the  extent  of 
democratic rights or civil liberties and individual life satisfaction. Instead, the results by 
Dorn  et  al.  (2008)  demonstrate  the  importance  of  cultural  factors  to  individuals’ 
happiness and individuals’ perception of how they benefit from formal institutions.  
Arguably, the differential outcomes of those previous studies might to some extent 
be caused by their focus on different country samples.
3 More specifically, the level of 
economic development of the countries in those samples might drive the results. We 
return to this later.  
Turning to the effects of institutional quality and the rule of law, the recent cross-
country  studies  by  Helliwell  (2006),  Helliwell  and  Huang  (2006)  and  Ovaska  and 
Takashima (2006) show rather clear support for positive effects of institutional quality, 
                                                
3 For example, Dorn et al. (2007) use the 1998 ISSP data set with 26 mostly OECD countries while 
Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008a) employ data from a world sample 66 countries of the WVS.    6 
and Fischer (2008a) finds that a stronger rule of law prevents market competition from 
reducing happiness. On the other hand, Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008a) find 
almost no association between institutional quality and individual happiness in a cross-
section of about 66’000 individuals from 66 countries. Again, the differences might be 
driven by either a (top-down or bottom-up) ecological fallacy in either of these studies, 
omitted variable biases or the different choice of sample.  
In a related area, the extent of constraints on politics, and the strength of political 
veto players may equally affect people’s happiness. A common argument is that most 
people are status-quo biased, and that the presence of such constraints slows down the 
reform process (Alt and Lowry, 1994; Tsebelis, 1995)
4 and, thus, increases well-being 
of the average risk-averse individual (Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 2008a, 2008b). 
The traditional argument, however, derives the welfare benefits of political constraints 
from the fact that they prevent the ‘tyranny of the majority’ (Koenig, 2001). Indeed, the 
results of Henisz (2000, 2002) indicate that constraints on policy-making are associated 
with objectively better economic outcomes. 
Often, the presence of veto players is directly linked to formal institutions that 
relate to the organization of government in a (potentially) multi-tier political system. 
More  specifically,  decentralized  political-decision  making  and  government  spending 
structures  may  introduce  potential  veto-players  across  tiers,  often  alongside  shared 
political  power  at  the  federal  level.  Indeed,  a  direct  beneficial  impact  of  fiscal 
decentralization (but not of political autonomy) was identified in Bjørnskov, Dreher, 
                                                
4 “For the initiator [of a new system] has the enmity of all who would profit by the preservation of the old 
institution and merely lukewarm defenders in those who would gain by the new ones”, Machiavelli, The 
Prince, 1513, cited in Feinberg (2006).   7 
and Fischer (2008b), while using the same data Bjørnskov, Dreher, and Fischer (2008a) 
find that bicameral systems – which increase the number of veto-players in the federal 
legislature – improve individuals’ satisfaction with their lives.  
In addition, the aggregate cross-country studies by Helliwell (2006) and Ovaska 
and Takashima (2006) – one stressing government effectiveness, the other economic 
freedom  –  also  suggest  a  clear  positive  impact  of  the  quality  of  these  two  formal 
institutions  on  well-being.  In  contrast,  the  multi-level  Extreme  Bounds  Analysis  in 
Bjørnskov,  Dreher  and  Fischer  (2008a)  shows  very  little  support  for  any  effects, 
positive or negative, of these two types of formal institutions. Additional cross-country 
findings in Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2007) also indicate no impact of government 
effectiveness per se on average happiness. However, all of these studies assume that its 
effects are homogenous across developed and developing countries – an assumption that 
may not be born out in reality and could be responsible for the confusing findings. 
Helliwell and Huang (2006) provide a first indication that this may be the case, as they 
interpret  their  findings  to  imply  that  honest  and  efficient  public  service  provision 
increases happiness in relatively poor countries while political and electoral institutions 
are positively related to happiness in relatively rich countries. 
In general, the findings of these aforementioned studies vary considerably, but are 
also virtually impossible to compare and to assess as they vary in (1) their sample sizes 
relying on different data sources (World Values Survey sample versus well-developed 
countries covered by the ISSP), (2) their definitions of happiness measures (aggregate 
averages, aggregated top three categories versus average individual), and (3) levels of 
analysis (macro-level versus combined macro- and micro-level).   8 
This  paper  tries  to remedy  some of  these  shortcomings  by: (1)  employing the 
widest  range  of  countries  possible,  combining  several  data  sources  from  different 
geographical regions that also include the often underrepresented African countries; (2) 
analyzing  subsamples  identifying  differential  impacts  by  levels  of  economic 
development; and (3) using two distinct measures of aggregate happiness, one reflecting 





In our attempt at resolving this issue, we draw aggregate data from a number of sources. 
To measure national average life satisfaction, we employ two different indicators, both 
based on the survey question ”All things considered, how satisfied are you with your 
life as a whole these days?”, which respondents answer on a ten-point scale. The life 
satisfaction scores employed here are taken from all the four available waves of the 
World Values Survey (WVS, 2004), a repeated cross-section with a growing number of 
participating countries.
6 For the first measure of happiness, we follow Helliwell (2006) 
and the approach in the World Database of Happiness in using the average national 
score on the life satisfaction question. As an alternative, we follow the World Values 
Survey codebook in using the percentage of the population answering in the top three 
categories, which arguably makes the measure less sensitive to cultural differences in 
                                                
5 What, however, this paper is not trying to resolve is the ecological fallacy problem that might arise from 
aggregating individual-level information (Robinson, 1950), as we analyze country-level data. Arguably, a 
country-level approach might well reveal the importance of population-level characteristics that might be 
disguised in a purely micro-level study (Pearce 2000). 
6 First wave: 1981-1984, second wave: 1989-1993 third wave: 1994-1999, fourth wave: 1999-2004.   9 
answering at the extremes of the scale (cf. Bjørnskov, 2006; Bjørnskov, Dreher and 
Fischer, 2007). While the correlation between the two measures is .94, it is worth noting 
that the country rankings change slightly between the measures.
7 The average measure 
is clearly more sensitive to respondents in the thinner tail of the happiness distribution, 
namely to low ranges of the life satisfaction score, but also to those in the middle and 
thus gives a good overall assessment of national happiness. On the other hand, using the 
WVS  coding  mitigates  cultural  differences  in  response  styles  that  may  introduce 
unnecessary noise when using average happiness (cf. Bjørnskov, 2006). 
To test for the impact of the quality of formal institutions on life satisfaction, we 
employ a set of alternative governance measures: 1) the ‘legal quality’ index from the 
Fraser Institute (Gwartney and Lawson, 2005); 2) the combined Gastil index of civil 
liberties and political rights from Freedom House (2005); 3) the Polity IV index of 
democracy from Marshall and Jaggers (2002); 4)-5) Helliwell’s (2006, C43 and 6-8) 
two groups of variables relating to “the honesty and efficiency of government” and “the 
operation of the democratic process,” which may be viewed as proxy of democratic 
                                                
7 One could well suspect that any results obtained with a national measure of happiness are contaminated 
by strong individual-level effects, thus giving rise to an ecological fallacy as discussed in section 2. 
However, one can calculate the country fixed effects from running an individual-level ordered probit 
regression (see Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 2008a). Comparing the fixed effects coefficients resulting 
from correcting for robust individual-level determinants of well-being with the simple national measures 
used here suggests that an ecological fallacy is not likely to be a problem, as the correlations between 
these coefficients and the two measures are .99 and .92 for the simple average and the top three coding, 
respectively.   10 
rights;
8 and 6)-8) three indices from Henisz (2000, 2002), the first measuring the extent 
of constraints on policy-making, the second measuring the strength of political veto 
players, and the third capturing the extent of ‘law and order’. The eight institutional 
measures are summarized in Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
While two of our indices (‘legal quality’, ‘law and order’) capture the protection 
of property rights, the Gastil index measures the protection of political rights and civil 
liberties more broadly. They also capture the freedoms of speech and of association, 
while citizens’ political rights in a narrow sense are reflected in the Polity IV index. The 
remaining  indices  are  designed  to  measure  either  government  effectiveness  or  the 
degree of discretion in policy-making. By testing these indicators against each other, we 
hope to be able to evaluate which elements of governance are responsible for potential 
consequences on national average happiness. 
In choosing our control variables, we take the specification in Helliwell (2006) as 
a  starting  point  and  supplement  it  by  additional  aggregate  variables  found  to  be 
important  determinants  of  well-being  in  Bjørnskov,  Dreher  and  Fischer  (2007). 
                                                
8  These  variables  derive  from  Kaufmann  et  al.  (2003),  with  the  first  variable  being  the  average  of 
government  effectiveness,  regulatory  efficiency,  rule  of  law  and  lack  of  corruption,  and  the  second 
variable the average of voice and accountability, and political stability. It nevertheless remains unclear 
how Helliwell arrives at measures for 1990 and 1981, as the Kaufmann dataset only starts in 1996. These 
two  highly  correlated  indices  are  also  used  in  Helliwell  and  Huang’s  (2006)  attempt  at  identifying 
differential effects in rich and poor countries.   11 
Descriptive statistics of all variables are shown in Table 2 while sources are given in the 
appendix. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
We include indicators of two dimensions of social capital: the average number of 
memberships in nine different types of voluntary organizations, which in the tradition of 
Putnam (2000) aims to capture social activity and social networks; and social trust – an 
indicator  of  honesty  and  trustworthiness  –  which  is  measured  by  the  percentage  of 
respondents answering yes to the question “In general, do you think most people can be 
trusted?”  Following  Helliwell  (2006),  our  baseline  also  includes  measures  of  how 
strongly people believe in god (measured by the national percentage answering ‘yes’ to 
the question “Do you believe in a superior being”), the divorce rate and the official 
unemployment  rate.  This  gives  us  a  maximum  sample  of  136  pooled  country-year 
observations from 55 countries potentially observed in either waves, namely in 1981, 
1990, 1995 and 1999, for which we have full data.
9 All countries are listed in Appendix 
Table A2. 
The baseline model is supplemented by a set of additional variables in a series of 
steps. First, we include period fixed effects to take care of joint trends over time and of 
                                                
9 As such, we estimate an unbalanced panel, not a cross-section. As happiness and institutions change 
slowly over time, inclusion of country fixed effects is not advisable. It may be argued that pooling the 
data artificially increases the number of observations. Furthermore, the unbalanced structure of the data 
gives some countries greater weight in the estimates than others. However, the main results remain when 
we weigh observations giving each country equal weight. They also remain when we use the 1999 cross-
section only.   12 
the  changing  country  composition  of  the  sample  across  waves.  Second,  we  include 
dummies  for  postcommunist  countries,  Latin  America  and  Asia,  which  previous 
research shows to be highly significant (Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 2007, 2008a). 
Third, we include openness to trade and the investment price level relative to the US, 
both of which are measures of international integration and business prospects and are 
robustly positively associated with happiness according to recent studies (Bjørnskov, 
Dreher and Fischer, 2007, 2008a).
10 
In the following,  we test for the influence of  the  institutional indicators using 
OLS. In order to test for the sensitivity of the results to the potential influence of single 
outlying observations, we  supplement the OLS results with estimates obtained by a 
robust  regression  technique,  which  iteratively  assigns  smaller  weights  to  the 
observations with larger deviations of their absolute residuals from the median residual. 
Finally, for testing the dependence of potential institutional impacts on the stage of 
economic development, we also use a reduced sample of country observations with an 
average GDP per capita above 8000 purchasing-power parity adjusted US dollars for 
which 80 country-year observations from 31 countries are available. The choice of a 
threshold level of 8000 USD may be considered ‘natural’ as it is approximately the 
level  at  which  most  studies  find  average  income  to  cease  being  associated  with 
subjective well-being. All results are reported for both happiness measures using the full 
sample and the reduced sample of rich countries. 
 
                                                
10  Bjørnskov,  Dreher  and  Fischer  (2008a)  find  additional  robust  determinants  of  life  satisfaction. 
However,  not  all  are significant  in  this sample  and  others  are  only  available for  a  small  number  of 
observations. We therefore do not include these variables in the full specification, but note that the results 
reported below remain unchanged if adding the additional variables.   13 
4. Results 
As a first simple way of illustrating the potential effects of institutional quality on life 
satisfaction, Table 3 reports the correlations between the institutional variables as well 
as their correlations with the two measures of happiness. First of all, the table illustrates 
the  difficulty  in  separating  different  institutional  characteristics, as  most  indices are 
highly related. The relative exceptions are the Polity IV index and the two political 
constraints indicators that are more moderately correlated to the remaining institutional 
indices. However, it is worth noting that most rich countries score a perfect 10 on the 
Polity IV index, which is therefore effectively right-censored.
11 Second, the table also 
shows that restricting the sample to only relatively rich countries reduces some of the 
correlations  and  thus  makes  it  potentially  easier  to  separate  the  effects  of  single 
institutions on happiness. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
4.1. Are formal institutions associated with happiness? 
Table  4,  column  1  first  replicates  Helliwell’s  (2006)  results  using  the  ‘honest  and 
efficient  government’  indicator  and  his  original  specification  with  average  national 
happiness as dependent variable, whereas the same column in Table 5 instead reports 
the results of using the share of respondents in the top three categories, i.e., the coding 
used  by  the  World  Values  Survey  (WVS)  of  the  life  satisfaction  questions.  As  the 
                                                
11 It is also well known that countries tend to fair better on the Polity IV index of democracy than on the 
alternative Gastil index of political rights and civil liberties or Henisz’s (2000) measures. The reason is 
that the latter two indices apply a broader concept of democracy that also entails civil rights, as explained 
in the previous section.   14 
estimates show, the existence of social networks increases happiness at the ten percent 
level of significance at least. At the one percent level, social trust, and believing in god 
increase  average  and  ‘top  three’  well-being,  while  divorce and  unemployment  rates 
reduce  well-being.  Our  variable  of  main  interest,  government  efficiency,  increases 
happiness, with a coefficient significant at the one percent level. 
A series of model extensions, as described before, are reported in columns 2-6 of 
both  tables.  Although  the  results  pertaining  to  the  control  variables  overall  remain 
qualitatively similar across our models, a few notable differences pertain.
12 First, the 
effects of memberships are not robust to using the top three tier life satisfaction scores 
when adding the control variables from Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2007) or, for 
both happiness measures alike, when restricting the sample to only rich countries in 
column 6. On the other hand, the other dimension of social capital – social trust – is 
strongly  significant  throughout.  Second,  the  effects  of  divorce  rates  only  show  up 
robustly  when  using  the  average  coding  while,  on  the  reverse,  the  effects  of 
unemployment are only robust for the top three tier measure. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
                                                
12 As the table shows, the introduction of regional dummies substantially improves the statistical fit. With 
respect to these variables, it is worth mentioning that people in Latin American countries, in particular, 
are happier than average. The difference to the rest of the world, all other things being equal, is +0.44 
points on the average measure and +5.6 percentage points, when using the WVS coding.   15 
Turning to the effects of honest and efficient governments, we basically replicate 
Helliwell’s (2006) main findings. The results in both tables nevertheless indicate that 
the  simple  model  in  columns  1-3  may  tend  to  overestimate  the  effects  of  formal 
institutions. When employing the WVS coding of life satisfaction, honest and efficient 
government just fails statistical significance in the sample of rich countries in column 6 
of  Table  4.  Overall,  there  hence  seems  to  be  some  support  for  the  influence  of 
institutional quality on happiness. Previous studies may nevertheless have overstated 
this effect. Calculating elasticities, the results show that the beta drops from .39 to .19 
when including additional, relevant, control variables.  
Moreover, the results in Tables 4 and 5 do not inform about which type of formal 
institutions matters. Given the rather strong correlations between various measures of 
governance, it is not obvious which type of formal institutions matters as one indicator 
might  proxy for another. In addition, the  differences across  the  two codings  of life 
satisfaction  also  reveal  (by  calculating  betas)  that  formal  institutional  quality  as 
measured by ‘honest and efficient government’ is relatively more important with the 
average  scores  while  informal  institutions,  measured  by  social  trust,  are  the  more 
important dimension when using the top three-tier WVS coding.  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Table 6 – employing the baseline of column 5 in the previous tables – tests the 
potential  importance  of the  broader  number  of alternative  institutional indicators as 
used in the previous literature and summarized in Table 1. The table first shows support 
for legal quality from the Fraser Institute as a determinant of happiness. This is also   16 
reflected in the significance of the Gastil index across columns, although the effects are 
substantially larger for the sample of only rich countries. Using the Polity IV index, 
which more narrowly captures the importance of democratic political institutions as 
opposed to market and judicial institutions, reveals a more mixed picture. Here, the 
index is only significant in the sample of rich countries. These results are reflected in 
the following panels, where Helliwell’s (2006) democracy index and Henisz’s (2000, 
2002) two measures of political constraints follow the structure of the Gastil index. In 
the last panel, the evidence for Henisz’s law and order index, on the other hand, is rather 
weak.  
Without  wanting  to  overstate  the  differences,  it  consequently  seems  that  the 
quality of formal institutions that relate to free markets and judicial impartiality matter 
in the full sample – the largest beta is that of legal quality, which is .36 – while the 
effect of indicators that are more likely to include components of political institutions 
and participation rights tends to matter as much in the sample of rich countries where 
the betas of the Gastil index and democratic process also reach .3 to .4. Due to the high 
interrelatedness of the measures, the robustness of any single finding is nevertheless 
uncertain.  
Table 7 therefore summarizes the results of testing the strength of the institutional 
indicators against each other. For all eight indices, respectively, one additional index of 
the seven remaining ones was added and the table reports the number of instances out of 
seven in which the index remains significant at conventional levels of significance. As 
such,  the  results  in  absolute  numbers  can  indicate  the  relative  strength  of  each   17 
institutional indicator.
13 For the average life satisfaction measure, legal quality quite 
clearly dominates in the total sample, never being insignificant at conventional levels. 
However, quite strong results are also obtained for ‘honest and efficient government’ (5 
times significant out of 7 cases) and Political Constraints V (4 out of 7 cases). For the 
high-income sample, it is less clear which index dominates as both legal quality, the 
Gastil  index,  democratic  process  and  the  Political  Constraints  V  measure  remain 
significant in all cases.  
When  using  the  WVS  coding  of  the  life  satisfaction  question  instead,  results 
change somewhat even though the two types of coding result in very similar country 
rankings  and  highly  correlated  scores.  Of  all  eight  indices,  only  legal  quality  does 
consistently well in the total sample. On the other hand, restricting the sample to rich 
and middle-income countries shows that the Gastil index and Political Constraints V 
remain significant in all cases, while democratic process fails once and legal quality, the 
Polity IV index and Political Constraints III remain significant in five cases. 
As such, the evidence remains mixed. First, the robust impact of legal quality 
across  the  two  different  definitions  of  happiness  and  the  two  sample  sizes  is  quite 
striking. However, for the full sample there are virtually no other robust relations across 
and within the two happiness measures. On the other hand, the overall picture looks 
different  for  the  richer  countries  where  both  legal  quality,  the  Gastil  index,  the 
democratic process measure, and Political Constraints III and V are fairly robust.  
                                                
13 An important caveat of this exercise is that the measures are correlated. As such, a few results in Table 
6 may be potentially misleading as variance inflation factors in roughly a quarter of the cases are close to 
or above 5 and in a limited number of cases above 10.    18 
With respect to the Polity IV index and to some extent also the Gastil index, it 
must be stressed that there is rather little variation in these indices at the top of the 
global  income distribution. As such, their profiles tend to follow the pattern of the 
effects of economic development on happiness. In other words, the specific relation 
between these indices and GDP per capita implies that they are relatively likely to pick 
up the non-linear relation between average income and happiness documented in other 
studies (cf. Schyns, 1998). Seen in light of this feature, the relative strength of the Gastil 
index may be more remarkable while also being less reliable since it measures the status 
of both economic-judicial and political institutions.
14 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
4.2. Splitting economic-judicial and political institutions 
As the results in Table 7 thus suggest, it is almost impossible to separate the effects of 
different types of formal institutions on happiness since they are highly correlated and 
strongly  related  to  economic  development.  In  addition  to  the  standard  analysis  we 
therefore perform the following simple three-step test: 1) we calculate the residuals of 
regressing the eight indicators on (log) GDP per capita, thereby taking out most joint 
variation  due  to  economic  development;  2)  we  use  these  residuals  as  if  they  were 
precise measures of institutions in a principal components analysis (Table A3 in the 
                                                
14 Indeed, splitting the Gastil index in political rights and civil liberties shows that the variation of the full 
index across the richer countries is driven by the second component, mirroring the invariance of the more 
narrowly defined Polity IV index (see Fischer, 2008b).   19 
appendix reports the specifics of this analysis); and 3) we rerun the analyses above 
using the component solution of the analysis. 
First  of  all,  the  principal  components  analysis  supports  the  existence  of  two 
orthogonal  components  that  can  be  readily  interpreted  as  a  political  institutions 
component and a component capturing the quality of economic and judicial institutions 
(see Table A3); as such, the results are broadly consistent with the similar analysis in 
Munck and Verkuilen (2002). Using these two scores – which we term ‘political factor’ 
and ‘economic factor’ – in place of the primary indices therefore should provide more 
precise information on the importance of the two separate types for happiness than the 
analyses above. As Table 8 shows, with some qualifications, this actually is the case. 
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
Starting with the findings for average happiness in the full sample, the results in 
column 1 only support an effect of the economic-judicial institutions as the coefficient 
on the political factor score is insignificant and virtually zero. On the other hand, none 
of the factors are significant in column 3 where we use the WVS coding. However, 
when restricting the sample to including only middle- and high-income countries, the 
picture  changes.  For  either  measure  of  life  satisfaction,  the  political  dimension  of 
institutions clearly dominates, while the economic factor remains insignificant. In other 
words,  our  results  indicate  that  whenever  countries  have  reached  a  certain  level  of 
economic development, the development of a democracy may be beneficial for overall 
national happiness while the development of factors such as a fair and efficient legal   20 
system  affects  the  concerns  of  citizens  in  all  countries,  rich  and  poor,  alike.
15  Our 
findings thus suggest that the importance of institutional types may change over the 
course  of  overall  development.  The  last  section  summarizes  and  discusses  the 
significance of the full set of findings. 
 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
What creates happiness and whether national happiness can be affected has been a key 
topic  in  recent  years  in  the  new  literature  on  happiness.  However,  many  empirical 
findings have been conflicting, not least those pertaining to the potential influence of 
institutional  quality.  This  paper  has  looked  closer  into  the  association  between  the 
quality of formal institutions and national happiness, paying attention to different types 
and  different  indicators.  Particularly,  we  have  estimated  the  potential  influence  of 
formal institutions by employing eight different indicators of institutional quality and 
governance that augment a standard baseline specification. 
Overall, our results support the existence of a positive and significant effect of 
institutions on average national happiness. However, some measures are clearly stronger 
than others, and in particular the arguably cleanest measure of democracy – the Polity 
IV index – is questionable in the full sample while a measure of legal quality from the 
Fraser Institute does quite well in all analyses. The results also illustrate the difficulty in 
separating different types and dimensions of institutional quality, as well as measuring 
such factors with precision. The high correlations between institutional indicators make 
                                                
15 It should be stressed that while the coefficient of the political factor seems much larger in the sample of 
rich countries than the coefficient of the economic factor in the full sample, the quantitative difference 
when calculating beta coefficients turns out to be marginal.    21 
strong specification tests between indicators infeasible, forcing us to rely on weaker 
tests  to  assess  which  institutions  are  likely  to  matter  more.  This  problem  is  only 
exacerbated in the subsample in which we delete the poorest countries, as only one very 
rich  country  –  Singapore  –  stands  out  as  being  undemocratic.  As  such,  the  results 
pertaining to purely political institutions can easily be questioned as in the academic 
discussion between those claiming the existence of an effect of democracy on happiness 
(cf.  Frey  and  Stutzer,  2000;  Helliwell  and  Huang,  2006)  and  those  arguing  against 
(Dorn et al., 2008). 
Yet,  creating  two  artificial  measures  of  institutions  employing  factor  analysis 
provides some support for the existence of independent effects of overall economic-
judicial and political institutions. The first type seems to dominate the second when a 
sufficient number of developing countries enter the sample, while analyses restricted to 
middle- and high-income countries show an additional strong support for a beneficial 
effect of the latter type of institutions. This finding is in line with Dorn et al. (2007), 
who  also  show  that  democracy  increases  happiness  in  a  cross-section  of  richer 
countries. As such, one could conjecture that the difficulty of obtaining any clear pattern 
in  previous  studies  may  have  been  because  these  studies  have  ignored  the  specific 
heterogeneity of the effect among different groups of countries that we find here.  
Overall, our findings indicate a real and positive association between the overall 
quality of formal institutions and national happiness, but given available measures of 
such features, it is difficult to differentiate the effects of particular types of institutions. 
However, our results in this paper suggest that citizens may derive subjective well-being 
from having democratic political institutions whenever the bulk of the population has 
escaped absolute poverty. Before that goal has been reached, only economic-judicial   22 
institutions  protecting  life  and  property  rights  contribute  to  happiness  that 
simultaneously may also fuel economic growth (cf. Knack and Keefer, 1995; Berggren, 
2003; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2008). As such, we note that part of the controversy in 
the  literature  may  simply  stem  from  the  systematic  parameter  heterogeneity  of  the 
institutional estimates that may have biased full-sample estimates towards zero in most 
large-sample studies. 
A  final  question  to  be  touched  upon  is  whether  our  findings  hold  any  policy 
implications.  We  explicitly  do  not  discuss  whether  governments  should  attempt  to 
follow such implications – a question which Frey and Stutzer (2000b) address at length 
– only whether the findings hold potential implications. 
First,  the  results  indicate  that  the  strength  of  legal  quality  is  associated  with 
happiness  although  this  association  seems  stronger  when  poorer  countries  enter  the 
sample. One of the potential ways to raise national happiness would thus seem to be to 
invest  in  a  fair  and  efficient  legal  system  in  poor  and  middle-income  countries,  as 
indicated by Ovaska and Takashima (2006). An additional benefit of such an approach 
would also be to increase the rate of economic growth as suggested by the vast literature 
on the topic. However, the everlasting problem remains how to encourage a fair and 
efficient legal system in which citizens can have confidence. 
Second, our findings suggest that democratization would in general be beneficial 
for national happiness when countries have reached a level of economic development at 
which most basic needs are met for the majority of the population. However, even if 
economic development and achieving a basic level of quality of life is an explicit aim of 
international development aid, the results of that literature show that such efforts are at 
best ineffective (e.g. Knack, 2004). Instead, the democracy literature suggests that when   23 
countries reach the cut-off level of 8000 USD employed here, democratization becomes 
steadily more likely and more stable with additional growth (cf. Lipset, 1959; Paldam, 
2007). In addition, Singapore, which is one of the very few rich non-oil countries that 
has not developed free political rights, does not seem comparatively unhappy. With an 
average level of 7.2 and 49 percent of respondents in the top three categories, Singapore 
is roughly on par with Italy and even higher than France. Although democratic rights 
therefore  in  general  seem  to  lead  to  more  happiness  in  richer  countries,  there  are 
apparently other ways to make citizens fairly happy. 
At the end of the day, we are left with a set of findings that entail rather difficult 
implications. Fair and efficient judicial systems seem to contribute to both happiness 
and economic development, but the persistent lack of such characteristics in many third 
world countries also suggests that institutional quality cannot simply be transplanted or 
copied from other countries. For middle and high-income countries, the existence of 
democratic political institutions is positively associated with happiness. The restriction 
of the effect of such institutions in richer countries fortunately represents only a minor 
problem, as most studies find that democracy tends to emerge when countries reach a 
certain level of economic development.  
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Table 1. Institutional measures 
Name  Source  Description 





Overall measure of the quality and capacity of the legal system, 
consisting of indices of judicial independence, impartiality of the 
courts, protection of intellectual property rights, military 
interference in law and politics, and integrity of the legal system. 
Gastil index  Freedom 
House 
(2005) 
Index capturing the existence of political rights and civil liberties; 
lower scores mean better protection of rights and liberties. 
Polity IV index  Marshall and 
Jaggers 
(2002) 
Index intended to capture three essential elements of democracy: 1) 
institutions and procedures enabling citizens to freely express their 
preferences for policies and leaders; 2) effective constraints on the 
exercise of power by the executive; and 3) the civil liberties of 





Average of rule of law, regulatory quality, bureaucratic efficiency 





Average of political stability and voice and accountability indices 





Index capturing constraints on the feasibility of policy change, 
defined as the degree to which a change in the preferences of one or 
more political actors is permitted to affect government policy. The 






Index employing the same data and logic as Political constraints III, 
but adding veto points within the judiciary and sub-federal entities. 
Law and order  Henisz 
(2000, 2002) 
Law and Order index from Political Risk Services (1996). Higher 
scores imply “a strong law and order tradition;” lower score mean “a 
tradition of depending on physical force or illegal means to setting 
claims.” 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
  Mean  Standard deviation  Observations 
Life satisfaction, average  6.867  1.089  136 
Life satisfaction, top three  46.981  19.159  130 
Average memberships  .422  .322  136 
Social trust  .326  .144  136 
Belief in god  .346  .239  136 
Divorce rate  1.909  1.218  136 
Unemployment rate  8.001  4.651  136 
Postcommunist  .301  .461  136 
Openness to trade  63.652  47.804  122 
Investment price level  .864  .294  122 
GDP per capita  13,157  6,866  122 
       
Legal quality  7.089  1.627  116 
Gastil index  2.199  1.509  126 
Polity IV index  7.139  4.695  127 
Honest and efficient government  .913  .954  136 
Democratic process  .913  .954  136 
Political contraints III  .409  .181  129 
Political contraints V  .654  .252  128 
Law and order  4.823  1.169  124 
 
 
   31 
Table 3. Correlations between life satisfaction and institutional measures 
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7. Political contraints V              1  .62 
(.64) 
8. Law and order                1 
                 
Average  .75  .64  .55  -.51  .36  .33  .42  .49 
Top three  .72  .62  .49  -.52  .40  .36  .39  .48 
Note: correlations in parentheses are for the reduced sample of rich countries, defined as those with GDP 
per capita above 8000 USD. 
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Table 4. Basic results, “average” coding 











































































































No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Period dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  136  136  136  122  122  80 
R squared  .778  .835  .847  .857  -  .804 
F statistic  82.59  76.61  69.09  59.09  61.04  21.69 
RMSE  .526  .458  .447  .433  -  .336 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** (**) [*] indicates significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]; 
Estimation is with OLS (columns 1-4 & 6); column 5 uses a robust regression technique and column 6 
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Table 5. Basic results, alternative (“top three”) coding 







































































  7.038*** 
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No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Period dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  130  130  130  121  121  80 
R squared  .724  .802  .807  .826  -  .801 
F statistic  84.01  79.56  61.76  46.40  33.61  22.53 
RMSE  10.315  8.835  8.843  8.339  -  7.292 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** (**) [*] indicates significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]; 
Estimation is with OLS (columns 1-4 & 6); column 5 uses a robust regression technique and column 6 
employs the subsample excluding poor countries defined as those with GDP per capita below 8000 USD. 
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Table 6. Alternative institutional measures, OLS 
  Average  Average  Top three  Top three 
  All  GDP>8000  All  GDP>8000 








Observations  112  79  111  79 
R squared  .829  .816  .802  .804 
F statistic  31.39  20.67  33.88  20.27 
RMSE  .409  .322  8.048  7.191 








Observations  121  79  120  79 
R squared  .83  .825  .821  .827 
F statistic  50.04  30.33  46.26  34.23 
RMSE  .464  .314  8.404  6.752 








Observations  121  79  120  79 
R squared  .828  .809  .819  .819 
F statistic  44.91  28.44  43.29  30.43 











Observations  122  80  121  80 
R squared  .837  .798  .788  .773 
F statistic  66.76  68.27  46.66  24.90 











Observations  119  77  118  77 
R squared  .827  .803  .812  .818 
F statistic  40.95  22.10  38.18  24.48 











Observations  118  77  117  77 
R squared  .832  .819  .815  .816 
F statistic  49.05  27.71  37.55  30.18 
RMSE  .456  .321  8.422  6.996 








Observations  117  77  116  77 
R squared  .823  .788  .802  .792 
F statistic  45.85  17.95  40.74  20.27 
RMSE  .461  .348  8.648  7.445 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** (**) [*] indicates significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]; 
all regressions include the baseline variables but only estimates of institutional quality are reported. 
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Table 7. Which indicators are robust? 
  Average  Average  Top three  Top three 
  All  GDP>8000  All  GDP>8000 
Legal quality  7*  7*  7*  5* 
Gastil index  1*  7*  1*  7* 
Polity IV index  0  4*  0  5* 
Honest and efficient gov.  5*  4*  3*  0 
Democratic process  2*  7*  4*  6* 
Law and order  2  0  0  0 
Political constraints  III  1  5*  0  5* 
Political constraints V  4*  7*  3*  7* 
Note: figures are instances in which the indicator remains significant at p<.05 when one other indicator is 
added. An asterix implies that it is also robust to the inclusion of (log) GDP per capita. 
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Table 8. Testing types of institutions 
  Average  Average  Top three  Top three 
  All  GDP>8000  All  GDP>8000 
















Observations  109  77  108  77 
R squared  798  .807  .791  .818 
F statistic  26.32  28.74  27.35  33.44 
RMSE  .427  .335  8.109  7.011 
















Observations  109  77  109  77 
F statistic  32.02  25.60  20.67  15.80 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** (**) [*] indicates significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]; 
all regressions include the baseline variables but only estimates of institutional quality are reported. The 
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Table A1. Data sources 
   
Life satisfaction, top three 
Life satisfaction, average 
Average memberships 
Social trust 
Belief in god 
World Values Survey (2006) 
Divorce rate 
Unemployment rate 
World Bank (2007) 
Postcommunist   
Openness to trade 
Investment price level 
GDP per capita 
Penn World Tables, Mark 6.1 (Heston et al., 2002) 
   
Legal quality  The Fraser Institute (Gwartney and Lawson, 2005) 
Gastil index  Freedom House (2005) 
Polity IV index  Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002) 
Honest and efficient 
government 
Helliwell (2006) 
Democratic process  Helliwell (2006) 
Law and order  Henisz (2000) 
Polcon III  Henisz (2002) 
Polcon V  Henisz (2000) 
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Table A2. Countries included in the study 
Albania  France  Peru 
Argentina  Georgia  Poland 
Armenia  Germany  Portugal 
Australia  Greece  Puerto Rico 
Austria  Hungary  Romania 
Belarus  Iceland  Russia 
Belgium  Ireland  Singapore 
Brazil  Italy  Slovak Republic 
Bulgaria  Japan  Slovenia 
Canada  Korea, South  Spain 
Chile  Latvia  Sweden 
China  Lithuania  Switzerland 
Croatia  Luxembourg  Ukraine 
Czech Republic  Malta  United Kingdom 
Denmark  Mexico  United States 
Dominican Rep  Moldova  Uruguay 
El Salvador  Netherlands  Venezuela 
Estonia  New Zealand   
Finland  Norway   
Note: countries in italics are not included in the sample of countries with a GDP per capita above 8000 
USD. 
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Table A3. Principal components analysis 
Variable  Political factor  Economic factor  Uniqueness 
Honest and efficient gov.  .038  .829  .308 
Democratic process  .296  .814  .231 
Legal quality  -.034  .591  .572 
Gastil index  -.909  -.207  .123 
Polity IV  .925  .005  .126 
Law and order  .083  .436  .556 
Polcon III  .447  .066  .526 
Polcon V  .509  .199  .335 
Eigenvalue  3.134  1.552   
Note: component loadings have been rotated. 
 
 
 